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Real Discrimination? 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,1 the Court 
held that state governments may be sued for violating the family 
leave provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).2 In 
recent years, the Court had ruled that Congress may authorize suits 
against state governments only when it acts pursuant to Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment (“Section 5”) and not under any other 
congressional powers.3 The Court thus concluded that federal laws 
prohibiting patent infringement,4 age discrimination in employment,5 
and disability discrimination in employment could not be used to sue 
state governments6 because they were not within the scope of 
Congress’s authority under Section 5.7  
But in Hibbs, the Court found that the federal law requiring 
employers to give employees unpaid time off work for family leave 
could be used to sue state governments.8 Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the Court in a 6–3 decision, said that Congress was 
concerned about preventing and remedying gender discrimination in 
 * Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.  
 1. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2000). 
 3. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 4. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999) (The Eleventh Amendment bars a claim against a state for violating patents. The Patent 
and Plant Protection Remedy Clarification Act is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s 
authority under Section 5 in authorizing federal court jurisdiction for such claims against state 
governments.). 
 5. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (state governments may not be sued 
in federal court for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The law is not a valid 
exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power that authorizes suits against state governments.). 
 6. Bd. of Trs. Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 536 (2001) (state governments cannot be 
sued under section 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act.). 
 7. Also, in Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004), the Supreme Court held that state 
governments can be sued for violating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act when the 
fundamental right of access to the courts is involved. 
 8. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). 
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employment9 and that Congress has more authority to act under 
Section 5 when it is dealing with types of discrimination, such as 
based on race or gender, which receive heightened scrutiny under 
equal protection.10 
Hibbs is a significant victory for civil rights plaintiffs. The case 
will be very important as lower courts consider whether states can be 
sued under other statutes that provide more protection than the 
Constitution in dealing with race and gender discrimination. For 
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
employment discrimination where there is a disparate impact based 
on race, gender, or religion,11 while the Constitution requires proof of 
discriminatory purpose.12 Similarly, section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act,13 as amended in 1982, creates a cause of action for racially 
disparate impact in voting systems, while the Constitution requires 
proof of discriminatory intent.14 After Hibbs, there is a strong 
argument that these crucial civil rights statutes can be used to sue 
state governments because they concern types of discrimination 
which receive heightened scrutiny. 
Yet there is a troubling aspect of Hibbs: it draws a distinction 
among types of discrimination, allowing Congress latitude to enact 
laws preventing and remedying some, but not other, forms of 
discrimination by state governments. Under current equal protection 
law, constitutional challenges have relatively little chance of success 
in suits objecting to forms of discrimination, such as those based on 
age and disability, which receive only rational-basis review. Thus, it 
is especially important that Congress have the authority to deal with 
these types of discrimination by statute. Yet, the effect of Hibbs and 
its predecessor decisions by the Supreme Court over the last decade 
 9. Id. at 1978–79. 
 10. Id. at 1977–78. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 12. See Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Employment 
Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999) (allowing suits against states pursuant to 
Title VII). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
 14. Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm’rs, 225 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2000); Mixon v. Ohio, 
193 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 1999) (section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does abrograte sovereign 
immunity). 
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is exactly the opposite: Congress is denied the authority to act where 
it is most needed. 
I certainly applaud the result in Hibbs, but disagree with its 
premise that there are some types of discrimination that really matter, 
while other types of discrimination do not matter even enough to 
allow congressional action. The Court has unjustifiably defined and 
limited Congress’s powers based on equal-protection jurisprudence’s 
rigid levels of scrutiny.  
Part I of this Article examines Hibbs and criticizes the distinction 
that it draws in allowing Congress much greater authority to act 
under Section 5 for some types of discrimination than for others. Part 
II explains the Court’s error by focusing on a specific example: the 
authority to sue states under Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act15 for discrimination against people with disabilities in 
government programs, services, and activities. Under the reasoning in 
Hibbs, Congress does not have the same authority to authorize suits 
against disability discrimination as it does for gender discrimination. 
This is fundamentally misguided, as there is an even greater need for 
Congress to be able to deal with types of government discrimination 
where constitutional challenges are less likely to succeed. In 
Tennessee v. Lane,16 the Court held that states sometimes can be sued 
under Title II, when a fundamental right is implicated. This is 
misguided in that states always should be able to be sued under Title 
II. Finally, Part III argues for an alternative conception of Congress’s 
powers under Section 5, one that would broadly empower Congress 
to act to prevent and remedy government discrimination.17  
 15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–34 (2000). 
 16. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). 
 17. In this Article, I do not challenge the Supreme Court’s expansion of sovereign 
immunity in the last decade, which obviously underlies the issue of when Congress can 
authorize suits against state governments. I have argued against sovereign immunity elsewhere. 
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001). In this 
Article, I argue that even with the expansion of sovereign immunity, the Court has erred in its 
limits on Congress’s powers to act under Section 5 to permit suits against state governments. 
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I. HIBBS: DISCRIMINATING AMONG TYPES OF DISCRIMINATION 
A. The Context of the Court’s Decision in Hibbs 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs18 is the 
Supreme Court’s most recent effort to define the scope of Congress’s 
powers under Section 5 and Congress’s authority to permit suits 
against state governments. The Supreme Court first considered the 
authority of Congress to override sovereign immunity and authorize 
suits against states in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,19 which held that Congress 
could authorize suits against state governments if it acts pursuant to 
Section 5. In Fitzpatrick, the Court held that state governments may 
be sued for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prevents employment discrimination based on race, gender, and 
religion.20 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, explained 
that the Fourteenth Amendment followed the Eleventh Amendment 
and thus can modify it.21 More importantly, the Court said that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was intended as a limit on state power. 
Justice Rehnquist explained:  
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising 
legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the 
constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one 
section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by 
their own terms embody limitations on state authority. We 
think that Congress may, in determining what is “appropriate 
legislation” for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States 
or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in 
other contexts.22 
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,23 in 1989, the Supreme Court 
held, 5–4, that Congress may override the Eleventh Amendment and 
 18. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). 
 19. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2000). 
 21. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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authorize suits against state governments pursuant to any of its 
constitutional powers, so long as the law in its text expressly 
authorizes such suits. The Court ruled that state governments could 
be sued pursuant to a federal environmental law24 because Congress 
was clear in acting under the commerce clause in authorizing suits 
against state governments. 
Seven years later, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,25 the Supreme 
Court expressly overturned Union Gas. The simple reality is that 
between 1989, when Union Gas was decided, and 1996, when 
Seminole Tribe was decided, there was a significant change in the 
composition of the Supreme Court. Four of the Justices in the 
majority in Union Gas had left the Court: Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and White. All four of the dissenters in Union Gas 
remained on the Court. They were joined by Justice Clarence Thomas 
and overruled Union Gas by a 5–4 margin. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court and stressed that 
Union Gas was an unprecedented expansion in Congress’s power to 
authorize suits against state governments. He explained:  
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-
making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh 
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by 
private parties against unconsenting States. The Eleventh 
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and 
Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional 
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.26  
The Court held that Congress only can authorize suits against state 
governments, and override the Eleventh Amendment, when it acts 
pursuant to Section 5.27 
 24. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2000). 
 25. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 26. Id. at 72–73. 
 27. For an excellent criticism of Seminole Tribe, see Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond 
Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1999); Herbert 
Hovencamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Lopez 
and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213 (1996); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole 
Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 495 (1997). 
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A year after Seminole Tribe, the Court decided City of Boerne v. 
Flores28 and significantly narrowed the scope of Congress’s Section 5 
powers. In City of Boerne, the Court held that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA)29 was not a valid exercise of Congress’s 
powers under Section 5. The Court ruled that under Section 5, 
Congress may not create new rights or expand the scope of rights; 
rather, Congress may act only to prevent or remedy violations of 
rights already recognized by the courts and such laws must be 
narrowly tailored, they must be proportionate and congruent to 
dealing with proven constitutional violations.30 
There is an obvious and crucial interrelationship between 
Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne: in deciding whether a state can be 
sued under a federal statute, the Court must resolve whether the law 
is a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 powers. Congress’s 
powers under Section 5 are limited to rights the Court already has 
recognized. If the Court upholds the law as permissible under Section 
5, the state may be sued, otherwise the litigation cannot go forward 
against the state government.  
Prior to Hibbs, there were three Supreme Court decisions—
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank,31 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,32 and University 
of Alabama v. Garrett,33—in which the Court considered whether 
laws are valid exercises of Congress’s Section 5 powers and a 
permissible basis for suits against state governments. In all three 
cases, the Court applied City of Boerne, and found the law invalid as 
an exercise of Congress’s Section 5 powers and precluded the suit 
against the state government. 
Florida Prepaid involved College Savings Bank, a New Jersey 
company that patented a system for students to save money to later 
pay for their college educations. Florida Prepaid, an agency of the 
Florida government, copied this system for use by Florida residents 
 28. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). 
 30. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20. 
 31. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 32. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 33. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
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to save money to attend Florida schools. College Savings Bank sued 
Florida Prepaid for, among other things,34 patent infringement.35  
In 1992, Congress expressly amended the patent laws to authorize 
suits against state governments for patent infringement.36 The 
Supreme Court, however, held that the law was not a valid exercise 
of power under Section 5 and thus could not be used to sue the state 
government.37 Although patents unquestionably are property and the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects property from being denied by state 
governments without due process, the Court found that the 
authorization of suits was impermissible because it was not 
proportionate or congruent to remedy constitutional violations.38 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated: “In enacting 
the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no pattern of 
patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional 
violations. Unlike the undisputed record of racial discrimination 
confronting Congress in the voting rights cases . . . Congress came up 
with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part of the States.”39 
The Court held that the law was not valid under Section 5 because 
“[t]he legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act 
does not respond to a history of ‘widespread and persisting 
deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the sort Congress has faced in 
enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation.”40 
Several cases were consolidated in Kimel.41 The named case 
involved a suit by current and former faculty and librarians at Florida 
State University, including Daniel Kimel, Jr. They alleged that the 
University’s failure to provide promised pay adjustments 
discriminated against older workers and thus violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).42 The Supreme Court 
 34. College Savings Bank also sued for a violation of the Lanham Act, but the Supreme 
Court, in a separate opinion, also found that this was barred by sovereign immunity. Coll. Sav. 
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 35. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630. 
 36. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 37. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630. 
 38. Id. at 646–48. 
 39. Id. 527 U.S. at 640 (citation omitted). 
 40. Id. at 645. 
 41. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
 42. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2000). 
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held that these claims against state agencies are barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. By a 7–2 margin with only Kennedy and 
Thomas dissenting, the Court concluded that the ADEA is an express 
authorization of suit against the states.43 The Court then ruled 5–4 
that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under 
Section 5 and that therefore it cannot be used to sue state 
governments.44 
Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion and was joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. 
The Court concluded that the burdens the ADEA imposes on state 
and local governments are disproportionate to any unconstitutional 
behavior that might exist.45 The Court emphasized that under prior 
decisions, only rational-basis review was used for age 
discrimination.46 The Court explained that there is not a “history of 
purposeful discrimination” based on age and that “[o]ld age also does 
not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they 
live out their normal life spans, will experience it.”47 Indeed, the 
Court said that states “may discriminate on the basis of age without 
offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”48 The Court said that 
age often is a relevant criterion for employers.49 
Therefore, the Court concluded that the broad prohibition of age 
discrimination in the ADEA was deemed to exceed the scope of 
Congress’s power. The Court declared: “Judged against the backdrop 
of our equal protection jurisprudence, it is clear that the ADEA is ‘so 
out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it 
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior.’”50 
 43. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73–74. 
 44. Id. at 78–84. 
 45. Id. at 86. 
 46. Id. at 83–84; see also, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
 47. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.. 
 50. Id. at 86 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)). 
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The Court stressed that the ADEA prohibits a great deal of 
conduct that is otherwise constitutional. The Court also emphasized 
that there were no “findings” by Congress of substantial age 
discrimination by state governments.51 Therefore, the Court stated 
that because of “the lack of evidence of widespread and 
unconstitutional age discrimination by the States, we hold that the 
ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”52 
In Alabama v. Garrett,53 the Court considered whether state 
governments may be sued for violating Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits employment discrimination 
against the disabled and requires reasonable accommodation for 
disabilities by employers.54 The plaintiff’s key argument to the Court 
was that the elaborate legislative history documenting government 
discrimination against the disabled made the ADA different from 
other laws the Court had considered in the last few years.55 The 
Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, rejected this argument and held 
that state governments may not be sued for violating Title I of the 
ADA. 
Patricia Garrett was the Director of Nursing at the University of 
Alabama, Birmingham hospital.56 She was diagnosed with breast 
cancer and took time off work to have surgery, chemotherapy, and 
radiation.57 When she returned to work she was informed that her 
position as Director of Nursing was no longer available. She sued 
under Title I of the ADA.58 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion began by stating that 
the ADA was a substantial expansion of rights compared to the 
Constitution. He explained that under equal protection, 
discrimination based on disability only need meet a rational-basis 
 51. Id. at 90. 
 52. Id. at 91. 
 53. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 54. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2000). 
 55. See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1981–83 (2003). 
 56. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 97 Chemerinsky book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 16:97 
 
 
 
test, being rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.59 
The ADA prohibits discrimination well beyond what would fail a 
rational-basis test and its requirement for reasonable accommodation 
of disabilities is significantly greater than the Constitution requires. 
The Court then concluded that Title I of the ADA is not 
proportionate or congruent to preventing and remedying 
constitutional violations. Chief Justice Rehnquist declared: “The 
legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show that 
Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state 
discrimination in employment against the disabled.”60 Justice Breyer 
attached a thirty-nine-page appendix to his dissenting opinion in 
which he listed the numerous references in the legislative history to 
government discrimination against the disabled.61 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion found these insufficient. He said that 
some were just anecdotes.62 He said that most involved local 
governments, not state governments, and local governments are not 
protected by state sovereign immunity.63 He said that some of the 
evidence concerns government discrimination against the disabled in 
providing services and that is Title II, not Title I, of the ADA. He 
observed that: “In 1990, the States alone employed more than 4.5 
million people. It is telling, we think, that given these large numbers, 
Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional 
state discrimination in employment against the disabled.”64 
Chief Justice Rehnquist contrasted the legislative record for the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, which he said was in “stark” contrast to 
the ADA.65 He noted the statistical findings by Congress in enacting 
the Voting Rights Act, such as “an otherwise inexplicable 50-
percentage-point gap in the registration of white and African-
American voters in some States.”66 He concluded that the 
congressional findings for the ADA were insufficient in comparison. 
 59. Id. at 365 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). 
 60. Id. at 368. 
 61. Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. at 370. 
 63. Id. at 370–71. 
 64. Id. at 370 (citations omitted). 
 65. Id. at 374. 
 66. Id. at 373. 
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He wrote:  
[I]n order to authorize private individuals to recover money 
damages against the States, there must be a pattern of 
discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be 
congruent and proportional to the targeted violation. Those 
requirements are not met here, and to uphold the Act’s 
application to the States would allow Congress to rewrite the 
Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this Court in 
Cleburne. Section 5 does not so broadly enlarge congressional 
authority.67 
B. Hibbs and its Dubious Distinction Among Types of Discrimination 
Hibbs involved a provision of the FMLA which entitles an 
eligible employee to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for, 
among other reasons, the onset of a “serious health condition” in the 
employee’s spouse, child or parent.68 The issue in Hibbs was whether 
this provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Section 
5, allowing it to be used to sue state governments. 
The Supreme Court, in a 6–3 decision, distinguished the early 
cases described above and permitted suits against state governments. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, focused on how “[t]he 
FMLA aims to protect the right to be free from gender-based 
discrimination in the workplace.”69 Although the FMLA is facially 
gender-neutral, and indeed Hibbs is male, the Court said that 
Congress made extensive findings that the absence of family leave 
has a disproportionate effect on women.70 The Court concluded: “In 
sum, the States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and 
fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of 
leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of 
prophylactic § 5 legislation.”71 
 67. Id.  
 68. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2000). 
 69. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1978 (2003). 
 70. Id. at 1978–81. 
 71. Id. at 1981. 
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The Court distinguished earlier cases, such as Kimel and Garrett, 
on the grounds that they involved types of discrimination that receive 
only rational-basis review, while gender discrimination triggers 
intermediate scrutiny.72 But the crucial question is why Congress’s 
power under Section 5 depends on the level of scrutiny applied by the 
Court under equal protection. 
The only answer given by the Court is the statement in Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion: “Because the standard for 
demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is 
more difficult to meet than our rational basis test . . . it was easier for 
Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”73 There 
are several problems with this. First, the Court never found that the 
denial of family leave constituted a constitutional violation. Since the 
failure to provide family leave was gender-neutral, and since it is 
highly doubtful that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, the 
FMLA cannot be seen as remedying constitutional violations. 
Second, other statutes dealing with types of discrimination that 
receive only rational-basis review very well may be about remedying 
constitutional violations.74 
Nor is there any other apparent reason why the level of scrutiny 
for a type of discrimination should define the scope of Congress’s 
power to act under Section 5. In fact, the Court’s approach seems to 
have it exactly backwards. In areas where constitutional protection is 
least likely to exist, statutory protection is most important. Under the 
Court’s rational-basis jurisprudence, it is very difficult to successfully 
challenge discrimination that does not receive heightened scrutiny. 
Especially in these areas, such as age and disability discrimination, 
Congress needs to have the authority to prevent and remedy wrongful 
government actions. 
The effect of Hibbs is that some types of discrimination matter 
and others do not; both constitutional and statutory protection is 
limited to the former. To show that this is a highly undesirable 
approach, the next part of the Article focuses on disability 
 72. Id. at 1981–82. 
 73. Id. at 1982. 
 74. See discussion infra Part II (concerning Title II of the ADA). 
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discrimination and why it, too, should be deemed within the scope of 
Congress’s power under Section 5. 
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH FOCUSING ONLY ON “REAL 
DISCRIMINATION”: THE EXAMPLE OF TITLE II OF THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT  
The problem with the Court’s approach in Hibbs is illustrated by 
focusing on a type of discrimination which receives only rational-
basis review: discrimination against people with disabilities. As the 
Court emphasized in University of Alabama v. Garrett,75 this is a type 
of discrimination which receives only rational-basis review,76 unlike 
Hibbs, which concerned gender discrimination that receives 
intermediate scrutiny under equal protection.77 Focusing on disability 
discrimination shows the lack of any basis for drawing a distinction 
among types of discrimination in defining Congress’s powers under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Moreover, in this part, I seek to demonstrate that even under the 
Court’s restrictive approach, it should find that Title II can be used to 
sue state governments. 
First, the Court’s distinction in Hibbs between types of 
discrimination that warrant heightened scrutiny and those that receive 
only rational-basis review is misguided, because even the latter can 
often touch fundamental rights that warrant intermediate or strict 
scrutiny. The Supreme Court long has held that “classifications 
affecting fundamental rights are given the most exacting scrutiny.”78 
For example, countless cases hold that discrimination with regard to 
voting, an express concern of Congress in enacting Title II, warrants 
strict scrutiny.79 Likewise, infringements of the right to travel for 
individuals with disabilities, another explicit area identified by 
Congress in Title II, receive strict scrutiny.80  
 75. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 76. Id. at 367. 
 77. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982. 
 78. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 79. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334–35 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 565–68 (1964). 
 80. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (Since “the classification 
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Congress, in adopting Title II, also sought to prevent and remedy 
the unjustified institutionalization of individuals with disabilities and 
the violation of the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable 
confinement.81 As described below, Congress found extensive 
discrimination against people with disabilities in the exercise of basic 
liberties, such as the right to marry, the right to procreate, and the 
right to custody of their children, all of which warrant strict 
scrutiny.82  
Most profoundly, Title II is about ensuring that Americans with 
disabilities have the same access to their government as all other 
citizens. In many contexts, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
fundamental importance of every person having access to his or her 
government.83 By prohibiting discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities in “services, programs, or activities,”84 Title II, above all, 
is concerned with ensuring that individuals with disabilities have full 
and complete access to their governments. 
In enacting Title II, Congress made express findings, supported by 
extensive documentation, of “pervasive” unconstitutional 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in government 
services, programs, and activities.85 The text of Title II includes 
explicit findings of persisting discrimination in “education . . . 
institutionalization . . . voting, and access to public services . . . .”86  
Congress, in enacting the ADA, found that, both historically and 
now, individuals with disabilities are subjected to the “widespread 
here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be 
judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.”).  
 81. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 
(1982). 
 82. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (the right to marry as a 
fundamental right); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (the right to custody of one’s 
children as a fundamental right); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the right to 
procreate as a fundamental right).  
 83. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (declaring that it is “[c]entral 
both to the rule of law and to . . . equal protection” that the government be available on an equal 
basis “to all who seek its assistance”); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (the right to 
petition government for redress of grievances); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) 
(right of access to the courts). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
 85. Id. § 12101(a)(2) (2000). 
 86. Id. para. (3). 
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and persisting deprivation of [their] constitutional rights” which the 
Court in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Board v. College 
Savings Bank87 said are required for Congress to act under Section 
5.88 For example, with regard to voting, Congress heard that “in the 
past years people with disabilities have been turned away from the 
polling places after they have been registered to vote because they 
did not look competent.”89 The legislative history documents that 
many persons with disabilities “cannot exercise one of [the] most 
basic rights as an American” because polling places were not 
accessible to persons with disabilities.90 In fact, a study found that 
twenty-one percent of polling places were inaccessible to individuals 
with disabilities in the 1988 elections and twenty-seven percent were 
inaccessible in the 1986 elections.91 A hearing on discrimination with 
regard to voting is filled with specific examples of individuals with 
disabilities being denied their constitutionally guaranteed right to 
vote.92  
Overall, the United States Civil Rights Commission, in a report 
extensively relied on by Congress in enacting the ADA, found that 
people with disabilities are “frequently denied . . . the right to vote”93 
and face barriers such as “[s]tate laws restricting voting rights of 
mentally handicapped persons, the “[d]enial of opportunity for 
institution residents to vote,” “[a]rchitectural barriers at polling 
places,” the “[a]bsence of assistance in ballot marking,” the 
 87. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 88. Id. at 640, 645 (The “propriety of any § 5 legislation must be judged with reference to 
the historical experience . . . it reflects.”). 
 89. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on S. 2345 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Res. and the 
Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 
(1988) (statement of Nancy Husted-Jensen, Chairman, Governor’s Commission on the 
Handicapped, Providence, R.I.), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST. OF PUB. L. NO. 101-336: THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1220 (1990) [hereinafter LEGIS. 
HIST.]. 
 90. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 12 (1989). 
 91. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, POLLING PLACE ACCESSIBILITY IN THE 1988 
GENERAL ELECTION 7 (1989).  
 92. Equal Access to Voting for Elderly and Disabled Persons: Hearings on H.R. 1250 
Before the Task Force on Elections of the House Comm. on House Admin., 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1984).  
 93. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL 
ABILITIES 39–40 (1983). 
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“[i]nequity of absentee ballots,” and “[r]estrictions on rights of 
handicapped persons to hold public office.”94  
Similarly, Congress documented that those with disabilities were 
frequently unconstitutionally deprived of their right of access to the 
courts and to their government. The legislative history documents 
that “[t]he courthouse door is still closed to Americans with 
disabilities—literally.”95 The Civil Rights Commission’s study found 
that seventy-six percent of state-owned buildings were inaccessible to 
persons with disabilities.96 Congressional committees heard 
testimony of “innumerable complaints regarding lack of access to 
public service—people unable to meet with their elected 
representatives because their district office buildings were not 
accessible or unable to attend public meetings because they are held 
in an inaccessible building.”97 These are examples of clearly 
unconstitutional acts of state and local governments in denying 
individuals with disabilities access to their government. 
A particularly important example of pervasive unconstitutional 
state government actions that motivated the enactment of the ADA is 
the impermissible confinement of individuals with disabilities. The 
legislative history of the ADA recounts numerous instances of 
individuals with disabilities being unconstitutionally confined and 
institutionalized. Indeed, the “Findings and Purposes” section at the 
beginning of the ADA mentions persistent unjustified 
“institutionalization” of people with disabilities.98 The Senate Report 
on the ADA explains that “[h]istorically, individuals with disabilities 
have been isolated and subjected to discrimination and such isolation 
and discrimination is still pervasive in our society[.]”99 Senator 
 94. Id. at 167; see also 135 CONG. REC. 19852 (Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Gore) 
(summarizing testimony and concluding: “[a]s a practical matter, many Americans with 
disabilities find it impossible to vote.”). 
 95. LEGIS. HIST., supra note 89, at 936 (statement of Sen. Harkin).  
 96. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 39. 
 97. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Sen. Comm. 
on Labor and Human Res. and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1989) (testimony of Illinois Attorney General Neil Hartigan).  
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)(3) (2000). 
 99. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 6 (1989). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/8
p 97 Chemerinsky book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Real Discrimination? 113 
 
 
 
Harkin, in introducing the ADA, said that one of its key purposes is 
“getting people . . . out of institutions . . . .”100 
The report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 
quoted extensively in the House and Senate Reports, discussed in 
detail the unconstitutional confinement of individuals with 
disabilities. The Civil Rights Commission described how historically 
individuals with disabilities have been needlessly isolated from the 
rest of society and confined, first at the hands of people who 
collected fees for their care and “locked their charges in the attic to 
starve or freeze to death”; then in unsanitary and overcrowded 
almshouses that generally did not provide care but were “merely 
custodial”; then in large state facilities that came to see their purpose 
as protecting society from people with disabilities as these 
individuals came to be seen as “sub-standard human creatures” and 
“waste products” during the growth of the eugenics movement.101 
The Civil Rights Commission report detailed the continuing 
unnecessary segregation and institutionalization of people with 
disabilities:  
The harshest side of institutionalization is the systematic 
placement of handicapped people in substandard residential 
facilities, where incidents of abuse by staff and other residents, 
dangerous physical conditions, gross understaffing, overuse of 
medication to control residents, medical experimentation, 
inadequate and unsanitary food, sexual abuses, use of solitary 
confinement and physical restraints, and other serious 
deficiencies and questionable practices have been reported.102  
Despite repeated calls for deinstitutionalization and integration of 
people with disabilities in society, widespread confinement 
continued. The Civil Rights Commission found:  
Despite such initiatives, a great many handicapped persons 
remain in segregative facilities. The Comptroller General has 
 100. 135 CONG. REC. 8508 (May 9, 1989); see also 136 CONG. REC. 10,877 (May 17, 
1990) (statement of Congressman Miller, co-sponsor of the ADA) (“Society has made [people 
with disabilities] invisible by shutting them away in segregated facilities . . . .”). 
 101. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 17–20.  
 102. Id. at 32–33. 
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estimated that about 215,500 persons were residing in public 
mental hospitals in 1974 and that some 181,000 persons were 
in public institutions for mentally retarded people as of 1971. 
In 1976, one study estimated that 1,550,120 people were in 
long term residential care facilities.103  
Congress also intended Title II to prevent and remedy violations 
of fundamental rights to marriage, procreation, and custody of one’s 
children. Congress was acutely aware of the tragic history of the 
eugenics movement in which states attempted to halt reproduction of 
people with disabilities and “nearly extinguish their race.”104 In fact, 
almost every state prohibited marriage and inflicted forced 
sterilization on individuals with disabilities.105  
Nor were such violations of the basic rights to marry and 
procreate a thing of the past. The Civil Rights Commission report 
relied on by Congress noted that fifteen states continued to have 
compulsory sterilization laws on the books, four of which included 
persons with epilepsy.106 Congress was aware that such abhorrent 
practices continued.107 The Commission also found that “[m]any 
states restrict the rights of physically and mentally handicapped 
people to marry.”108  
The legislative history describes how “[h]istorically, child-custody 
suits almost always have ended with custody being awarded to the 
non-disabled parent.”109 The House Report described discriminatory 
policies against individuals with disabilities in “securing custody of 
their children.”110 The Civil Rights Commission found that many 
parents with disabilities “have had custody of their children 
 103. Id. at 35. 
 104. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 462 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
 105. Id. at 463; see also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding compulsory 
sterilization “in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence” and because “three 
generations of imbeciles is enough.”).  
 106. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 37. 
 107. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351 (1978) (Indiana judge ordered the 
sterilization of a “somewhat retarded” fifteen-year-old girl).  
 108. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 40. 
 109. LEGIS. HIST., supra note 89, at 1611 n.10 (testimony of Arlene Mayerson).  
 110. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 41 (1990).  
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challenged in proceedings to terminate parental rights and in 
proceedings growing out of divorce.”111  
This brief description shows that even in an area of discrimination 
that receives rational-basis review—disability discrimination—there 
are implications for fundamental rights. Thus, the distinction in Hibbs 
between types of discrimination receiving strict scrutiny and those 
that receive only rational-basis review as the grounds for defining 
Congress’s power under Section 5 makes little sense. 
Second, the Court’s approach in Hibbs ignores Congress’s 
authority to find extensive discrimination by state and local 
governments, even if it is not in an area that would trigger heightened 
scrutiny. The Court’s prior decisions require that the federal law be 
directed at preventing or remedying constitutional violations. In 
Florida Prepaid, for example, the Court stressed the lack of evidence 
of unconstitutional infringements of patents by state governments.112 
In Garrett, the Court again emphasized the lack of evidence of 
unconstitutional discrimination by state governments in state 
employment.113 Nothing in Hibbs changes that; in fact, Hibbs 
emphasizes that in areas receiving heightened scrutiny Congress has 
greater authority to act beyond remedying constitutional violations.114 
But this distinction makes no sense. Congress can find extensive 
government discrimination, warranting statutory action, regardless of 
whether there are constitutional violations. Again, Title II of the 
ADA illustrates this. The ADA was the result of more than twenty 
years of hearings and investigations into the pervasive discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities. Congress held sixteen committee 
hearings and sixty-three field hearings, issued five committee reports, 
and engaged in prolonged floor debate.115 After two years of fine-
tuning in committee and floor deliberations, the ADA was passed by 
a vote of 91–6 in the Senate and 377–28 in the House.116  
 111. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 93, at 40. 
 112. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 640 (1999). 
 113. 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001). 
 114. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003). 
 115. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 4–5, 8–9 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 24–28, 31 
(1990). 
 116. Kathleen Hale, Toyota v. Williams: Further Constricting the Circle of Difference, 4 
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Congress included within the ADA explicit findings about 
widespread discrimination against individuals with disabilities by 
state and local governments in their services, programs, and 
activities. The ADA declares Congress’s finding that “historically, 
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with 
disabilities,” and that “such forms of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive 
social problem.”117 The statute itself states that “discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as 
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, 
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health 
services, voting, and access to public services.”118 Based on these 
findings, Congress “invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority, 
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment” as the 
basis for enacting the ADA.119  
The point is that there is no basis for the Court’s distinction in 
Hibbs, that only some types of discrimination are important enough 
to warrant congressional action and suits against state governments. I 
focus on Title II as my illustration, but certainly the same could be 
shown for countless other laws that prevent and remedy types of 
discrimination that receive only rational-basis review. 
In Tennessee v. Lane120 the Court confronted the issue of whether 
state governments could be sued for violating Title II.121 The 
plaintiffs were a criminal defendant and a court reporter.122 Both were 
paraplegics unable to reach second-floor courtrooms without 
elevators.123 The named plaintiff, Lane, was forced to crawl up two 
flights of stairs to attend his hearing.124 
In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that state governments may be 
sued for discriminating against people with disabilities with regard to 
J.L. SOC’Y 275, 288 n.50 (2003). 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000). 
 118. Id. § 12101(a)(3) (2000). 
 119. Id. § 12101(b)(4) (2000). 
 120. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
 122. Id. at 1982–83. 
 123. Id. at 1982. 
 124. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol16/iss1/8
p 97 Chemerinsky book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004]  Real Discrimination? 117 
 
 
 
the fundamental right of access to the courts. Justice Stevens, writing 
for the Court, emphasized that there is a well-established fundamental 
right of access to the courts and that Congress may enforce it by 
authorizing suits against state governments. He explained: “The Due 
Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment, as applied to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
both guarantee to a criminal defendant such as respondent Lane the 
‘right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might 
frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.’”125 The Court also 
explained that in other contexts as well, such as civil cases, a 
fundamental right of access to the courts has been recognized.126 The 
Court thus concluded that the State of Tennessee could be sued in this 
case for discriminating against people with disabilities with regard to 
their right of access to the courts. 
Tennessee v. Lane is to be applauded for allowing states to be 
sued under Title II, but the problem is that it appears that such suits 
can go forward only when a fundamental right is involved. But as 
described above, Congress found discrimination against people with 
disabilities across a broad spectrum of activities. The ability to sue 
under Title II should not be limited to just some of these. In fact, 
Lane is likely to cause courts significant problems in deciding when 
states can be sued under this statute. There is no canonical list of 
fundamental rights and it is not clear how much the fundamental right 
must be implicated to allow the suit against the state to go forward. 
Moreover, Congress’s power to act under Section 5 should not 
depend on whether a fundamental right is involved. Congressional 
power is least needed when there is a fundamental right; these are the 
situations when judicial protection is likely to be available. Lane, for 
example, should have been able to succeed directly under the 
Constitution, since the state was denying his fundamental right of 
access to the courts. Congressional power is most important when no 
fundamental right is implicated because it is especially then that 
legislative remedies are crucial if there is to be any limit on 
discrimination against people with disabilities. 
 125. 124 S. Ct. at 1988. 
 126. Id. 
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Lane thus takes the same approach to defining Congress’s powers 
under section 5 as did Hibbs a year earlier. Together Lane and Hibbs 
establish that Congress has more authority to act under Section 5, and 
thus to authorize suits against state governments, when it is dealing 
with claims of discrimination or violations of rights which receive 
heightened scrutiny. But they are both flawed for the same reason: 
Congress’s power to act under Section 5 should not depend on the 
level of scrutiny the Court has applied. 
III. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER: 
EMPOWERING CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 5 
The central flaw in the Court’s approach in cases like Florida 
Prepaid, Kimel, Garrett, and Hibbs is its very narrow conception of 
Congress’s power under Section 5. This, of course, is based on its 
ruling in City of Boerne.127 In this part, I argue for a very different 
view of Congress’s power under Section 5, granting it broad 
authority to expand the protection of rights so long as rights and 
liberties are not diluted.  
The Constitution’s protection of rights long has been understood 
as the floor, the minimum liberties possessed by all individuals. The 
Ninth Amendment provides clear textual support for this view: “The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”128 The 
Ninth Amendment is a clear and open invitation for government to 
provide more rights than the Constitution accords. 
State governments certainly can do this both by judicial decisions 
and by statute. For instance, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. 
Robins,129 the United States Supreme Court held that the California 
Supreme Court could recognize a state constitutional right to use 
shopping centers for speech purposes, even though the United States 
Supreme Court had ruled that no such right exists under the 
Constitution.130  
 127. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 128. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 129. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).  
 130. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
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Likewise, there is no doubt that Congress, by statute, can provide 
rights greater than the Court recognizes in the Constitution. For 
example, private race discrimination does not violate the Constitution 
because of the absence of government action. However, federal civil 
rights laws that prohibit discrimination by private places of 
accommodation and private employers create statutory rights where 
the Court has found no constitutional protections.131  
This seemingly obvious premise, based on the Ninth Amendment, 
that Congress can expand the scope of rights, means that Congress 
may do so even when it disagrees with a Supreme Court decision that 
refused to find a right in the Constitution. Some critics of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act emphasized that Congress should 
not be able to overrule the Supreme Court’s “reading” of the 
Constitution.132 But if the Court reads the Constitution to not include 
a right, Congress or the states may act to create and protect that right. 
In other words, the Court’s interpretive judgment that a particular 
right is not constitutionally protected is in no way incompatible with 
a legislature’s statutory recognition and safeguarding of the liberty.133 
Section 5 should be interpreted as according Congress this 
authority. Section 5 states: “The Congress shall have power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”134 
As is usually the case with difficult constitutional issues, the answer 
to this question cannot be found in the text or the framers’ intent. The 
word “enforce” is sufficiently ambiguous to allow either view as a 
plausible interpretation of Section 5. The Supreme Court in City of 
Boerne claimed that the word necessarily means that Congress can 
only remedy and cannot determine the substantive meaning of rights. 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated:  
 131. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 which prohibits racial discrimination by places of public accommodation). 
 132. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 443 (1994). 
 133. Part II argues why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act should be seen as a 
statutory expansion of rights. 
 134. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5. The same issues can be raised as to Congress’s powers 
under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment that 
contain almost identical language. 
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Congress’ power under § 5, however, extends only to 
“enforc[ing]” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . 
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are 
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to 
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
restrictions on the states. Legislation which alters the meaning 
of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the 
Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by 
changing what the right is.135 
But this begs the key question of what “enforce” means. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines “enforce” as: “I. To put force or 
strength into. . . . II. To bring force to bear upon. . . . III. To produce, 
impose, effect, by force.”136 Congress “enforces” the Fourteenth 
Amendment when it expands the scope of liberty under the due 
process clause or increases the protections of equal protection. In this 
sense, congressional expansion of rights is enforcing by 
strengthening the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Dictionaries, of course, do not determine the meaning of the 
words in the Constitution. My point is simply that there is nothing 
certain about the meaning of the word “enforce” that supports Justice 
Kennedy’s claim that it precludes Congress from using it to expand 
the scope of constitutional rights. Justice Kennedy argued as if the 
term enforce had a precise meaning that supported his position as the 
correct way to understand Congress’s Section 5 power. No such 
precise meaning exists. 
Phrased slightly differently, the word “enforce” might be defined 
in many alternative ways, two of which are to implement and to 
remedy. Justice Kennedy chose the latter. But the former seems 
equally plausible in the context of Section 5. Congress, by that 
provision, is given the authority to implement, as best it can, the 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as due process and 
equal protection. Congress can do this by expanding the scope of 
these rights if it decides that it is the best way to ensure, or to 
implement, these protections. 
 135. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 136. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 244–45 (2d ed. 1991). 
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Nor does the framers’ intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment 
answer the issue. Even assuming that framers’ intent should be 
controlling in constitutional interpretation, a premise that I reject,137 
there is no indication that the issue was ever considered when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and ratified. Justice Kennedy in 
City of Boerne argues that the legislative history of Section 5 resolves 
the issue: “The Fourteenth Amendment’s history confirms the 
remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement 
Clause.”138 
Justice Kennedy says that a rejected proposed version of Section 5 
shows that Congress meant Section 5 power to be solely remedial.139 
Representative John Bingham had introduced a draft amendment 
which would have provided: “‘The Congress shall have power to 
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the 
citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection 
in the rights of life, liberty, and property.’”140 Justice Kennedy says 
that there was strong opposition to this provision and that the revised 
provision, Section 5, was not opposed in the same manner.141 
There is no doubt that the revised Section 5 has less sweeping 
sounding language than the Bingham proposal. Yet, there is not a 
word in the debates quoted by Justice Kennedy that concerns whether 
Congress’s power should be only to remedy what the Court 
determines to be a constitutional violation, or whether it includes 
congressional authority to expand rights. All that Justice Kennedy 
shows is that language with a narrower phrasing was enacted. The 
substantive difference in the phrasing is completely assumed by 
Justice Kennedy.  
In fact, the quotations used by Justice Kennedy do not support his 
position that Section 5 was intended to be only remedial in scope. 
Justice Kennedy quotes Representative Bingham saying that “the new 
draft would give Congress ‘the power . . . to protect by national law 
 137. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987) 
(arguing against originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation). 
 138. 521 U.S. at 520. 
 139. Id. at 520–22. 
 140. Id. at 520 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866)). 
 141. Id. at 522–23. 
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the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic . . . 
whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the 
unconstitutional acts of any State.’”142 Justice Kennedy next quotes 
Representative Stevens that “the new draft Amendment ‘allow[s] 
Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States.’”143 Finally, 
Justice Kennedy quotes Senator Howard as saying that Section 5 
“‘enables Congress, in case the States shall enact laws in conflict 
with the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a 
formal congressional enactment.’”144 
None of these quotations support the view that Congress’s power 
is solely to remedy violations of rights found by the Court, and not to 
expand rights safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Surely, the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act can be seen, in Representative 
Bingham’s words, to “protect”145 rights or to “correct the unjust 
legislation of the states,”146 in Representative Stevens’ language. 
Laws expanding the scope of rights are very much in accord with 
Senator Howard’s goal of advancing the principles of the 
amendment. A careful reading of the very legislative history that 
Justice Kennedy invokes shows that it could be used equally 
persuasively to support either view. 
Thus, the question concerning Congress’s Section 5 power is not 
resolved by the text, the framers’ intent, or precedent. The meaning 
of Section 5 must be decided based on policy considerations. I 
believe that this is virtually always the case in constitutional law and 
that rarely can normative questions about the desirable meaning of 
the Constitution be answered based on descriptive sources. 
So what policy reasons does Justice Kennedy offer to support his 
view of Section 5? Justice Kennedy invokes the need to preserve the 
Court as the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. Justice 
Kennedy quotes Marbury v. Madison147 and writes: “If Congress 
could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior paramount 
 142. Id. at 522. 
 143. Id. at 522. 
 144. Id. at 522–23. 
 145. Id. at 522. 
 146. Id. at 522–23. 
 147. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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law, unchangeable by ordinary means.’ It would be ‘on a level with 
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, . . . alterable when the 
legislature shall please to alter it.’”148 Justice Kennedy concludes this 
part of the majority opinion by declaring: “Shifting legislative 
majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent 
the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article 
V.”149 
This is the fundamental flaw in Justice Kennedy’s opinion: he 
equates a Supreme Court decision failing to find a right in the 
Constitution with the conclusion that no right can be created by 
Congress. The former, however, in no way entails or implies the 
latter. The Court’s conclusion that a particular right does not exist in 
the Constitution does not mean that the right cannot exist through 
other legal sources, such as federal or state legislation. 
In other words, Justice Kennedy makes a crucial error when he 
assumes that a Supreme Court decision finding that a constitutional 
right does not exist precludes the legislative process from recognizing 
such a right. If the Supreme Court concludes that the Constitution 
requires government to act in a particular way, Congress cannot 
overturn that result. For instance, Congress cannot overturn by statute 
Gideon v. Wainwright’s150 holding that the government must provide 
counsel in criminal cases where there is a potential sentence of 
imprisonment. Similarly, if the Court decides that the Constitution 
prohibits the government from acting in a specific manner, Congress 
cannot authorize the forbidden conduct. For example, no legislature 
can overturn Roe v. Wade’s151 holding that the Constitution prevents 
the government from prohibiting abortion. 
But it is inherently different when the Court decides that no right 
exists in the Constitution. Such a ruling means that the government is 
unconstrained by the Constitution and may act as it wants. This 
includes the power of the legislature to create the very right that the 
Court concluded is not constitutionally protected. If the Court in Roe 
v. Wade had found that there was not constitutional protection of the 
 148. 521 U.S. at 529 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177). 
 149. 521 U.S. at 529. 
 150. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 151. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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right to abortion, Congress and state legislatures still would have had 
the power to create and safeguard such a right by statute. This is what 
RFRA did: the Court in Employment Division v. Smith152 had decided 
that there was no constitutional right of individuals to have an 
exemption from neutral laws of general applicability that burden 
religion.153 In RFRA, Congress created a statutory right that protects 
individuals from such laws, except in cases where the government 
can meet strict scrutiny.154 
There is another important flaw in Justice Kennedy’s approach to 
Section 5: he assumes that it is possible to draw a meaningful 
distinction between laws that remedy violations of rights and statutes 
interpreting the Constitution. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
states: “While the line between measures that remedy or prevent 
unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change 
in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have 
wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and 
must be observed.”155 
The problem is that any law expanding rights can be characterized 
as a remedy for a problem. The only reason why the legislature 
would act is based on a perceived ill that needs solution. Almost 
always Congress can tie this evil to some constitutional claim. The 
Court in City of Boerne accepts that the Voting Rights Act and its 
amendments were enacted under Section 5 to remedy discrimination 
in voting.156 Likewise, RFRA was adopted by Congress because of its 
perception that there was a problem, in that people often had their 
religious freedom wrongly limited by neutral laws of general 
applicability.157 
Limiting Congress under Section 5 to remedies simply imposes a 
fact-finding burden on the legislative process. Congress can enact any 
 152. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 153. Id. at 879. 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000). 
 155. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20. 
 156. Id. at 533; but see Stephen Carter, The Morgan “Power” and the Forced 
Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 841 (1986) (arguing that 
there was insufficient fact-finding to justify concluding that the Voting Rights Act is remedial). 
 157. In fact, Justice Kennedy cites to the extensive testimony in Congressional hearings 
supporting this view. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–31. 
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law expanding rights under Section 5, but it first must document the 
existence of a problem and call its action remedial. However, there is 
no constitutional requirement for legislative hearings or fact-finding. 
Indeed, the presumption in favor of upholding laws means that it is 
assumed that the legislature found sufficient facts to support its action 
unless it can be shown that the law serves no legitimate purpose or is 
not rationally related to the end. As Professor Cohen observed, once 
it is assumed that Congress is a better forum for determining issues of 
fact, congressional determinations of factual sufficiency should not 
need any evidence at all.158  
There are two primary reasons why the Court should have 
concluded in cases from City of Boerne to Hibbs that Section 5 is not 
limited to remedial legislation, but rather allows Congress to expand 
rights. First, the protection of additional rights should be regarded as 
inherently desirable under the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment, 
so often forgotten, is significant here. The Ninth Amendment is a 
constitutional reminder that the rights in the Constitution are just the 
minimum and that the existence of these rights in no way denies the 
existence of other liberties.159 The Ninth Amendment is a powerful 
signal encouraging the recognition of additional freedoms beyond 
those created by the Constitution.  
How can other rights come into existence? One way, of course, is 
for the Court to interpret the Constitution to protect rights not 
enumerated in its text. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Goldberg’s 
concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Brennan, invoked the Ninth Amendment as support for finding a 
constitutional right to privacy.160 Another crucial way for additional 
rights to arise is for legislatures, including Congress, to create and 
protect them. 
Where possible, the Constitution should be interpreted to fulfill 
the Ninth Amendment’s teaching and allow government to create 
additional rights. In other words, in choosing between two plausible 
 158. William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 612 (1975).  
 159. For an excellent collection of essays on the Ninth Amendment, see THE RIGHTS 
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, vols. 1, 2 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993). 
 160. 381 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1965). 
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interpretations of a constitutional provision, one which grants the 
legislature the authority to safeguard additional rights and one which 
does not, the former should be chosen. As described above there are 
two ways of interpreting Section 5, one which permits Congress to 
use its authority to expand rights, and the alternative which limits 
Congress to remedying violations of rights recognized by the Court. 
The former should be chosen under the principle that increasing 
rights is presumed desirable under the Constitution. 
There is a second reason why it is desirable to allow Congress to 
expand constitutional rights under Section 5: it is preferable to allow 
each branch of government to interpret the Constitution so long as 
there is no violation of what the Court interprets the Constitution to 
mean. Every government official, at every level of government, takes 
an oath to uphold the Constitution.  
In recent years, many constitutional scholars have supported the 
view that constitutional law is best understood as a dialogue between 
the Court, the other branches of government, and society.161 As 
Professor Stephen Carter has forcefully argued, allowing Congress to 
protect a right pursuant to Section 5 in response to a Supreme Court 
decision refusing to recognize a constitutional right furthers this 
notion of a constitutional dialogue.162 Legislatures cannot respond 
with statutes to Supreme Court decisions finding that the Constitution 
prohibits or requires government conduct. But legislatures can act 
when the Court finds no right in the Constitution, because that in no 
way implies a limit on the legislative power to statutorily create and 
protect the additional liberties.163 
In other words, it is preferable to interpret Section 5 to accord 
Congress the authority to expand rights, both because increasing 
rights is presumptively desirable under the Constitution and because 
independent constitutional interpretation, not inconsistent with 
Supreme Court rulings, is desirable. Limiting Congress to providing 
remedies for violations of rights found by the Court, as the Court has 
 161. See, e.g., PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1986); Barry Friedman, 
Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993). 
 162. Carter, supra note 156, at 852–56. 
 163. For an excellent development of this position, see Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing 
of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 
589 (1996). 
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done in cases from City of Boerne through Hibbs, loses both of these 
benefits and thus should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recent federalism decisions limiting 
Congress’s power to authorize suits against state governments are 
flawed on many levels. They are based on a broad concept of 
sovereign immunity that is at odds with a Constitution where all in 
government should be accountable and where no one is above the 
law. The decisions also fail to recognize a vital role for the federal 
government in acting to prevent and remedy civil rights violations. 
Thus, it is not surprising that I applaud the Court’s decision in 
Hibbs for rejecting sovereign immunity and according Congress 
power to enact and enforce a federal civil rights law. Although the 
result in Hibbs is laudable, its reasoning is not. The Court clearly is 
saying that only some forms of discrimination are sufficiently real 
and pervasive to warrant federal legislative or judicial action. But for 
those who are discriminated against based on their age or disability, 
the impact is just as real as race or gender discrimination, There is a 
need for national legislation to combat these, and other forms, of 
discrimination, and Congress’s power should be interpreted to allow 
such laws. 
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